It is argued that both the "Free Will Theorem" (FWT) and the "relativistic GRW model with flash ontology" (rGRWf) hiddenly assume the before-before experiment's result, and for this reason both FWT and rGRWf imply free will in the world outside free experimenters.
The Free Will Theorem of John Conway and Simon Kochen [1] assumes that experimenters are capable of freely choosing measurement settings. The theorem basically states that this assumption of free will "in the particles inside ourselves" and the experimental violation of Bell's inequality together imply free will also in "the particles all over the universe".
In more technical terms, what the authors of the FWT mainly claimed in the first version of their theorem is:
Where:
Freedom means the supposed capacity of experimentalist A of choosing his measurement settings independently of the choices done by his colleague experimentalist B.
Bell means experiments demonstrating violation of Bell inequalities [2] .
Determinism means that the outcome of an experiment is determined by the information accessible to the particles from the past (temporal causality).
Statement (1) was first questioned by Roderich Tumulka [3] . Without entering into the (undoubtedly important) subtleties of his formulations, what Tumulka states is that Bell experiments do not imply (1) but rather:
In other words, the failure of determinism does not necessarily follow from Bell experiments. In the modified stronger version of their theorem Conway and Kochen state [4] : (3) and:
Covariant dynamics refers to events that are related to each other through only covariant or Lorentzinvariant (relativistic) links. If these events are locally deterministic one has a covariant deterministic model, and if they are locally random a covariant stochastic one.
Regarding statement (3) Tumulka and co-authors, and also other authors, claim that it is not new [5, 6] , but is nothing other that Bell's theorem otherwise formulated.
(It seems to me that [7] actually provides a simple and elegant proof of (3)).
By contrast, Tumulka and co-authors consider statement (4) wrong. To prove this they give an explicit model called "relativistic GRW model with flash ontology", (rGRWf) which according to the authors is stochastic and covariant [5] .
In a recent comment Nicolas Gisin nicely illustrates that the origin of this somewhat confused dispute lies in very different understanding of what a "covariant quantum process" is. Gisin stresses that in rGRWf the events that happen (each single pair of flashes f A , f B ) cannot be covariant. Covariant is only the "cloud of future events" (i.e. the probability distribution). Therefore, in some sense, both [4] and [5] are correct: while Tumulka and co-authors "correctly insist that rGRWf is as covariant as possible", Conway and Kochen "correctly stress that it is not more covariant than possible" [6] .
The aim of my Comment is to show, firstly, that if the content of FWT reduces to statement (3), then the theorem does not deserve the name of "free will", for it does not exclude non-local determinism. Additionally, I show regarding (4) that by declaring Flash Ontology (rGRWf) covariant Tumulka and co-authors implicitly assume the result of the before-before (Suarez-Scarani) experiment [8] [9] [10] .
Indeed statement (3) implies only the failure of local determinism. It is however possible to construct a Suarez-Scarani model that is both non-local and deterministic, i.e., each event is determined by the information accessible from the past although in a non-covariant way [11] . We remind that the Suarez-Scarani model considers relativistic experiments with beam-splitters in motion in such a way that each of them, in its own reference frame, is first to select the output of the photons (before-before timing). Then, each outcome becomes independent of the other, and the nonlocal correlations should disappear [8, 9] . Such a non-local model assumes time-ordered non-covariant influences, and if one combines it with local determinism one obtains a nonlocal full-deterministic (temporal causal) model. For beforebefore timing the model predicts disappearance of nonlocal correlations with maintenance of possible local ones [12] , and does not entail signaling [13] . Suarez-Scarani models have been experimentally tested and refuted [10] .
Consequently, a more appropriate version of the Free Will theorem would be:
In any case, (5) excludes more determinism, and thereby allows for more free will than (1) and (3).
We turn now to statement (4): How is it possible that Tumulka and co-authors claim that the Flash Ontology is covariant [5] (and not only "as covariant as possible" like Gisin suggests [6] )? It seems to me that the reason for this claim is hidden in the following Tumulka's statement in [3] : "The objective facts are where-when the flashes occur, and it is enough if a theory prescribes, as does rGRWf, their joint distribution in a Lorentzinvariant way. Whether nature chooses the space-time point f B first, and f A afterwards, or the other way around, does not seem like a meaningful question to me."
As said above, it is possible to construct a testable, and hence physically "meaningfull" model assuming timeordered links between space-like separated events. Thus the question Tumulka refers to is clearly "meaningful", and he himself is wrong. Yet the before-before experiment proves Suarez-Scarani models wrong and demonstrates that nature does the correlations dismissing any time order. In this sense Tumulka is right: On the one hand, if the time order does not exist, then each single pair of flashes (f B ,f A ) can be considered a single event coming from outside space-time, and the concept of covariance does not apply. On the other hand, there where this concept makes sense, the model is covariant. In conclusion, it is before-before experiment which makes Flash Ontology covariant.
But there is something more. Demonstrating local randomness alone, though it suffices to refute determinism, it is not yet enough to prove "free will". Indeed anyone who believes to share "this valuable commodity" will certainly expect to be able of controlling surrounding randomness to some extent. Now the before-before experiment demonstrates effects in which control of quantum randomness happens from outside space-time, and in this sense it can also be considered an experimental proof of free will on the part of nature (provided there is free will in our brains!) [14] . But this also means that Flash Ontology implies free will since it assumes correlated "flashes" that cannot be explained by any history in space-time.
In conclusion, no experiment can prove "the free will of the experimenter". But if one assumes this free will, then the before-before experiment demonstrates free will also in the world outside the experimenter. Since the FWT and the rGRWf Flash Ontology implicitly assume the before-before experiment, both descriptions imply free will in "the particles all over the universe" and, in this respect, FWT and the rGRWf are equivalent.
